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Congratulations, Mr. President ... here is our agenda
On Tuesday, November 4, 2008, the citizens of the
United States will decide who is going to succeed
George W. Bush in the White House. Presidential
elections in the U.S. have always been a particular
event in the political calendar. Their extraordinary
appeal to Europeans on the one hand stems from
the multi-million dollar show surrounding the elec-
toral process, which goes far beyond the European
understanding of a mere political campaign. On the
other hand there is of course the pure political and
military power linked to the
position of the last remaining
superpower’s head of state. A
third aspect, which makes U.S.
elections interesting to Euro-
peans is the idea of getting a
snapshot of the current public opinion in America
through the citizens’ vote, which holds implications
not only for international relations in general, but
with regard to the role and future development of
the transatlantic partnership in particular. However,
this rather passive approach is not only irritating; it
is even dangerous, because it limits Europeans to
being spectators instead of contributing, proactive
partners. The fate of the transatlantic relationship
does not solely depend on the person that will give
his inaugural address on January 20 next year. Its
fate will rather be decided by the way Europeans
react to and interact with the new U.S. President, as
well as to which extent they are willing and able to
set an agenda and contribute to its implementation.
Europe is still too passive
The European approach of merely observing in
terms of transatlantic relations is founded on a sub-
stantial strategic deficit within most EU member
states’ capitals, paralyzing proactive initiatives for
fostering the European column in the transatlantic
building. Consequently – from a U.S. perspective –
Europe has remained in a state of being more of a
passive bystander concerning transatlantic ties,
instead of becoming a shaping power. This has led to
a specific problem, especially after the events of
9/11. Washington ignored the relevance of the trans-
atlantic partnership because some EU member states
didn’t act the way the U.S. wanted them to. It rather
preferred other formats for political action, such as
the Coalition of the Willing, leading to Europeans
developing little interest in the future of the part-
nership. The U.S. attitude has nothing to do with an
intentional disparagement of
European political action in
general. It is rather the result of
a reality check concerning
effective solutions following
American interests. Washington
has always acted according to its own national inter-
est, and it will continue to do so in the future. This
rather pragmatic and legitimate behaviour is foun-
ded on a traditional American perspective on inter-
national relations: Why should America listen to
those who seem to be deaf, dumb, and blind in
regard to global engagement, pragmatic political
choices, and strategic arrangements directed at secu-
ring the status of a unipolar world system? 
Of course this attitude does not reflect the reality of
a globalized world, which has changed dramatically
in the last decade. America’s clumsiness in recent
efforts for effective and sustainable crisis and con-
flict management has proven that the idea of a uni-
lateral Western dominance has failed to meet the
expectations of the countries that are most affected
by the negative side of globalization. Through
various means other players have developed their
own appeal and sovereignty of interpretation when
it comes to international relations, e.g. Russia, China
or India, but also regional organizations such as the
EU, ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-
tion (SCO), or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Military force no longer represents the core element
“Europe has remained in a state of
being more of a passive bystander
concerning transatlantic ties, instead
of becoming a shaping power. ”
The fate of the transatlantic relationship does not solely depend on whether John McCain or Barack Obama will
move into the White House after the elections next week. It will rather be decided by the way Europeans react to
and interact with the new U.S. President, as well as to which extent they are willing and able to set an agenda
and contribute to its implementation.
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of political power; today’s politics are about develop-
ing convincing and efficient structures for the inter-
pretation and implementation of political actions.
Political power derives from effectively dealing with
the risks and challenges that have snuck into our
homes and lives: energy security, climate change,
financial crises, demographic change, migration, over-
stretched health care systems, and social security.
The EU needs to go strategic
Consequently two things need to change if the EU’s
role within the transatlantic partnership is to be
saved from marginalization. First, the U.S. needs to
give up its reluctance to accept the reality of a multi-
polar world order. This step goes further than mere-
ly dealing with multilateral instead of unilateral
solutions. It means accepting
the growing influence of other
actors and the decline of
Western dominance on world
affairs. Second, the European
nations need to become a cred-
ible partner for the upcoming
administration in Washington,
capable of dealing with the
major tasks of our time. The
first step cannot be achieved
without the latter, but it is primarily the European
Union that holds the key to this development.
Europe needs to go strategic if it wants to convince
Washington of the transatlantic partnership’s effi-
ciency within a multipolar system. One move in that
direction could be the introduction of a conceptual
hierarchy for the European Union’s strategy papers,
especially in reference to the European Security
Strategy (ESS), leading to a set of priorities and con-
necting them with the necessary means to achieve
them (see also Bauer/Baumann: “ESS 2.0 –
Establishing strategic hierarchy in Europe”,
C·A·PERSPECTIVES 1/2008). The EU´s activity in the
Caucasus with Nicolas Sarkozy’s efforts to negotiate
a cease fire agreement between Russia and Georgia,
Brussels’ decision to launch an observation mission
in that area, and the EU’s initiatives concerning the
financial crisis have been good steps forward.
Europe needs to continue on that road in order to
keep up with the pace that was set by the dynamics
of political, economic, financial, and social interde-
pendencies, not only on a regional but also on a glob-
al level. Therefore the question is less of an if, but
more of a when the EU is ready to take up its role as
a global partner for cooperative organizations or
entities that wish to shape globalization and its
implications for societies. More identity, more effi-
ciency and more political willpower support the
development of necessary decision making struc-
tures and capabilities, leading to more political
options, but also to more responsibility. This might
also mean having to handle unprofitable tasks or
tasks that are not preferable. On the other hand
fewer identity, less efficiency, and less political will
limit any structural or capability oriented effort for
improvement and almost certainly lead to the mar-
ginalization of Europe.
Issues that need to be prepared
In order to launch a new era of cooperation between
the United States and Europe after November 4,
2008, and in order to roll back
the unfruitful militarization of
the transatlantic relations since
9/11, when NATO for the first
time in history invoked article
5, there are certain areas of
interest and specific tasks that
need to be prepared by the
Europeans in advance, in order
to discuss them with the new
administration in Washington.
1) Creating internationally approved guidelines for a
new global financial system that help overcome the
current deficits of and the public mistrust in the
banking sector, and which provide options for future
business by supporting the progress of finding an-
swers to shared challenges. The restructuring of the
global financial market system has to be founded on
the economic reality of today, meaning to accept the
continuing shift of economic power to Asia. Espe-
cially the emergence of China has to be seen more
as an opportunity for multilateral solutions instead
of being perceived as a threat to the dominance of
the West.
2) Energy security and climate change have to
remain top priorities for further political and – even
more important – economic dialogue between the
United States and Europe. Especially with the finan-
cial crisis affecting national budgets and funding
plans for research and development the topic of re-
storing ecologic stability and safety for our children
and grandchildren needs to be preserved as a – if not
the – major priority for political action.
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“More identity, more efficiency and
more political willpower support the
development of necessary decision
making structures and capabilities,
leading to more political options, but
also to more responsibility. This
might also mean having to handle
unprofitable tasks or tasks that are
not preferable.”
3) Fostering the global non-proliferation regime
through a commitment to open dialogue. Europe
and the United States have to show endurance and
patience in terms of identifying options for further
improvement of international relations. Weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) should never become an
instrument in securing the dominance of a unipolar
power system against the constant dynamics of po-
litical and economic power in a whole web of cen-
tres of gravity. In the case of the nuclear dispute with
Iran, Europe needs to increase the political and eco-
nomic pressure on the regime. It is therefore neces-
sary to convince China and Russia to follow a more
substantial system of sanctions in the UN Security
Council.
4) Developing forums for strategic transatlantic and
international dialogue by restructuring and reani-
mating the G8, NATO, and the United Nations. In
particular with regard to NATO, the transatlantic
partners need to develop options beyond the article 5
Alliance in order to overcome the militarization of
transatlantic relations since 9/11. In the case of
Georgia, NATO and its limited options for action
(membership or no membership) have proven to be
more of a problem than a solution in this area of
overlapping neighbourhoods with Moscow. There-
fore the EU needs to commit itself substantially to a
diplomatic solution and more stability in the Black
Sea area. Certain pressure has to be put on Moscow
in this scenario without provoking Cold War-like
reflexes in the Kremlin. The same accounts for the
issue of missile defence in Europe and the continu-
ation of peace talks between Palestinians, Israel, and
its neighbours.
5) Different ways of interpreting
values and human rights and
their role in the fight against
transnational terrorism have to
be addressed very frankly in
order to find common solutions.
Therefore, the European Union
member states need to take in
prisoners being released from
the Guantanamo Bay detention
camp and facing the danger of
falling victim to persecution and
torture in their home countries.
Currently there is no agreement
on that issue within Europe.
However, if one argues against
Guantanamo and calls for the
protection of human rights, then one has the obliga-
tion to help when there is an opportunity to put an
end to the Guantanamo system.
6) The United States need to be involved in any plan
for further strengthening European autonomous
capacities and capabilities for civilian and military
operations. Every effort directed at the consolidation
of the industrial and technological base, or the mar-
ket for the goods produced through it, any attempt
to establish further planning and command struc-
tures in the European Union, and every initiative for
the establishment of consolidated European armed
forces has to be prepared in consultations with
Washington. This creates the necessary confidence
and sense of partnership on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topics such as Iraq or Afghanistan should be avoided
in the beginning, because they have poisoned any
attempt to reanimate the transatlantic partnership in
the past. However, sustainable and measurable pro-
gress in the areas mentioned above could provide the
common ground und public support for touching the
sensitive issue of more European commitment to
those areas of conflict. This optimistic approach is
based on one key conclusion: We may not always
share the same opinions, but we are doomed to co-
operate because we are bound to each other. That is
the true nature of what Barack Obama called the
“community of common destiny”in his speech at the
Berlin Victory Column this past July when he was
referring to the transatlantic partnership.
If Europe is not capable of getting its act together in
terms of strategic thinking and strategic action it will
make no difference whether John
McCain or Barack Obama wins the
election. There is this one opportu-
nity to convince American policy-
makers: It not only makes sense to
talk to Europe, it is even worth it.
Not being prepared to meeting the
next administration’s expectations
in terms of bigger strategic involve-
ment and more substantial commit-
ment could mean the end of closer
political US-EU relations for quite
some time.
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